Surprise! An (almost) hit piece from Drudge

Drudge is "reporting" that, in the past, Clark made what might seem to be supportive noises about the Iraq conflict. As usual, Drudge is high on bluster, but low on facts and analysis. Disingenuous Drudge "reports" that Clark congratulated Bush and Blair for their courage and resolve in defeating the Iraqi army. I think most people - even those who were opposed to the war - shared those sentiments. Drudge also goes on selectively to quote General Clark's testimony on the Hill on 9/26/02, where he commented positively on the following: 1. The US' right to act unilaterally when necessary for self-defense; 2. That Saddam Hussein was a threat; 3. That Saddam Hussein had WMDs; 4. That Saddam Hussein was actively pursuing nuclear capabilities; 5. That Hussein was a decadelong problem that needed to be addressed; and 6. That there have been contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda; "bad actors in the same region together...[who] are going to bump into each other. Here is the full transcript of General Clark's House testimony. So, how is Clark's current position inconsistent with the one he discussed in 2002? It's not. Let's go to the quotes: "Our President has emphasized the urgency of eliminating these weapons and weapons programs. I strongly support his efforts to encourage the United Nations to act on this problem. And in taking this to the United Nations, the President’s clear determination to act if the United Nations can’t provides strong leverage undergirding further diplomatic efforts. "But the problem of Iraq is only an element of the broader security challenges facing our country. We have an unfinished, world-wide war against Al Qaeda, a war that has to be won in conjunction with friends and allies, and that ultimately be won by persuasion as much as by force, when we turn off the Al Qaeda recruiting machine. Some three thousand deaths on September 11th testify to the real danger from Al Qaeda, and as all acknowledge, Al Qaeda has not yet been defeated. Thus far, substantial evidence has not been made available to link Saddam’s regime to the Al Qaeda network. And while such linkages may emerge, winning the war against Al Qaeda may well require different actions than ending the weapons programs in Iraq." "The critical issue facing the Unites States now is how to force action against Saddam Hussein and his weapons programs without detracting from our focus on Al Qaeda..." "In the near term, time is on our side, and we should endeavor to use the UN if at all possible. This may require a period of time for inspections or even the development of a more intrusive inspection program, if necessary backed by force." If efforts to resolve the problem by using the United Nations fail, either initially or ultimately, the US should form the broadest possible coalition, including its NATO allies and the North Atlantic Council if possible, to bring force to bear. Force should not be used until the personnel and organizations to be involved in post-conflict Iraq are identified and readied to assume their responsibilities. Force should be used as the last resort; after all diplomatic means have been exhausted, unless information indicates that further delay would present an immediate risk to the assembled forces and organizations. This action should not be categorized as “preemptive.” "If we proceed as outlined above, we may be able to minimize the disruption to the ongoing campaign against Al Qaeda, reduce the impact on friendly governments in the region, and even contribute to the resolution of other regional issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iranian efforts to develop nuclear capabilities, and Saudi funding for terrorism. But there are no guarantees. The war is unpredictable and could be difficult and costly. And what is at risk in the aftermath is an open-ended American ground commitment in Iraq and an even deeper sense of humiliation in the Arab world, which could intensify our problems in the region and elsewhere." So, General Clark was actually advocating the following: 1. That we should put increased pressure on Iraq via the UN; 2. That we should implement a vigorous, intrusive inspection regime in Iraq via the UN; 3. That any UN resolution should leave open the threat of force; 4. That force should be a last resort; 5. That force should be used only when the postwar era has been planned; 6. That any use of force against Iraq be done with the support of as many allies as possible; and 7. That the action should not be seen as "preemptive". How on Earth is that different from what he's saying now? After the Bush adminstration lied about the WMDs and nuclear threat, after they went into Iraq without a NATO coalition or a coalition including most of our military allies, after the post-war "reconstruction" has been such an unplanned shambles, it seems as if General Clark's words were prescient. How is his House testimony different from this?: Clark said his Army career taught him that "the use of force is only a last resort" that wasn't justified in Iraq. "I'm a soldier," he said. "I've laid on the battlefield bleeding." Or this, which was in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee just three days after the House hearing: "And whether this is the right way, the right time to do it depends in large measure on how we proceed. And this is why I underscore again and again the importance of diplomacy first and going through the United Nations, because I think that gives us our best way of reaching out to achieve this objective with minimum adverse impact on the struggle against al Qaeda. The longer we can reasonably keep the focus on al Qaeda, the better that war is going to go, in my view." "I think that there is a substantial risk in the aftermath of the operation that we could end up with a problem which is more intractable than we have today." "One thing we're pretty clear on is that Saddam has a very effective police state apparatus. He doesn't allow challenges to his authority inside that state. When we go in there with a transitional government and a military occupation of some indefinite duration, it's also very likely that if there is an effective al Qaeda left -- and there certainly will be an effective organization of extremists -- they will pour into that country because they must compete for the Iraqi people; the Wahhabis with the Sunnis, the Shi'as from Iran working with the Shi'a population. So it's not beyond consideration that we would have a radicalized state, even under a U.S. occupation in the aftermath." "On the other hand, if we go in unilaterally, or without the full weight of international organizations behind us, if we go in with a very sparse number of allies, if we go in without an effective information operation that takes us through the -- and explains the motives and purposes and very clear aims and the ability to deal with the humanitarian and post-conflict situation, we're liable to super-charge recruiting for al Qaeda." "When you're talking about American men and women going and facing the risk we've been talking about this afternoon, and if you're talking to the mothers and the loved ones of those who die in that operation, you want to be sure that you're using force and expending American blood and lives and treasure as the ultimate, last resort; not because of a sense of impatience with the arcane ways of international institutions or frustration from the domestic political processes of allies." "Well, I think it's -- it is a matter for the Congress to determine. I would hope that before we would use force as authorized here, we would have exhausted all other means. If there's a way of incorporating that in the resolution, I think it makes the resolution stronger, not weaker." "Now, if we go in with a strong coalition; if we go in with a U.N. resolution behind us; if we go in with the full weight -- the fullest possible weight of international law and international opinion, then I think it can reinforce what we're doing against al Qaeda, even though there will be some distraction on the part of the commanders and the national leadership who are involved in the campaign." "And so unless there's information that we're not being presented that says we have to take this action right now to go in and disrupt Saddam Hussein, we can't wait a week, we can't wait four weeks or whatever, then it seems to me that we should use the time available to build up our legitimacy. And that's why I'm advocating intrusive inspections."